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Abstract
The article proposes adopting the Capability Approach as a theoretical framework to analyse 
the child’s right to development. Currently, the child’s right to development is realised as the 
child’s right to become an adult. This interpretation is problematic on several grounds, primar-
ily its usage of developmental psychology as an underlying narrative to conceptualise child-
hood and interpret children’s rights, and its lack of respect for children’s agency. Using 
the Capability Approach’s conception of ‘human development’ as an alternative framework 
can change the way in which childhood and children’s development are conceptualised and, 
consequently, change the interpretation of the child’s right to development. It can accommo-
date simultaneously care for the child’s future and the child’s life at the present; promote 
respect for a child’s agency and active participation in her own growth; and lay the foundations 
for developing concrete measures of implementation.
Keywords
children’s rights; right to development; capability approach; childhood studies; UN Convention 
on the Rights of the Child
Introduction
The UN Convention on the Rights of the Child provides broad protection for 
children’s development. Five articles (Articles 18, 23, 27, 29 and 32) protect 
eight domains of development (physical, mental, moral, social, cultural, spir-
itual, personality and talent), and a sixth, Article 6, protects the child’s right to 
life, right to survival and right to development. Nonetheless, it is not clear 
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© 2013 Noam Peleg DOI 10.1163/15718182-02103003
This is an open-access article distributed under the terms of the Creative Commons Attribution 3.0 Unported 
(CC-BY 3.0) License. http://creativecommons.org/licenses/by/3.0/
<UN>
524 N. Peleg / International Journal of Children’s Rights 21 (2013) 523–542
enough what are the theoretical or practical implications of providing children 
with the legal right to development. This article suggests that the first stage in 
interpreting this unique right of children is to establish the meaning or mean-
ings of the terms ‘children’s development’ and childhood. Only then will it be 
possible to discuss what it means for children to have a right to development.
The term ‘children’s development’ is usually perceived in psycho-social 
terms, focusing on the process of transformation from childhood to adulthood. 
Such conceptualising of ‘children’s development’ resonates with the concep-
tion of children as ‘human becomings’,1 and leads to a narrow interpretation of 
the child’s legal right to development, primarily as the child’s right to become 
an adult. This approach subjugates the right to development to support the 
child’s future, thus overlooking other meanings of childhood and ignores 
children’s agency. As the jurisprudence of the UN Committee on the Rights of 
the Child demonstrates,2 this approach also lacks coherency and creates 
serious difficulties in implementation. The core argument of this article is that 
changing the definition of ‘children’s development’ can result in reconceptual-
ising the child’s right to development as well.
The article suggests that adopting the Capability Approach as an alternative 
normative framework can remedy these shortcomings in the current under-
standing of the child’s right to development. Adopting the perception of human 
development as ‘freedom’3 can redefine the meaning of ‘children’s develop-
ment’ in a way that includes not only the child’s developmental psychology, 
but also the child’s entitlement to define the course of her life; to respect the 
child’s life in the present; to respect the child’s agency and voice; and to lay 
the foundations for concrete measures of implementation.
Thus far, the discussions concerning the Capability Approach have largely 
ignored children,4 which left it ‘under-theorized in relation to children’,5  
and children’s rights. It was only recently that Martha Nussbaum and Rosalind 
Dixon have addressed the relationship between children and the Capability 
Approach, arguing that the Capability Approach can be used as a theoretical 
1) James, A. et al, Theorizing Childhood (Cambridge: Polity, 1998); James, A. and A. James, 
Constructing Childhood (Basingstoke: Palgrave Macmillan, 2004); Lee, N., Childhood and Society 
(Gosport: Open University Press, 2001); James, A. and A. Prout, ‘Re-presenting Childhood: Time 
and Transition in the Study of Childhood’ in Constructing and Reconstructing Childhood. 
James, A. and A. Prout, eds. (2nd edition, London: Routledge, 1997) 230-250; Freeman, M.,’The 
Human Rights of Children’ Current Legal Problems 63 (2010): 1-44.
2) Peleg, N., ‘Time to Grow Up: The UN Committee on the Rights of the Child’s Jurisprudence 
of the Right to Development’ in Law and Childhood Studies. Freeman, M., ed. (Oxford: Oxford 
University Press, 2012) 371-391.
3) Sen, A., Development as Freedom (Oxford: Oxford University Press, 1999).
4) Comim, F. et al, ‘Introduction – Theoretical Foundations and the Book’s Roadmap’ in Children 
and the Capability Approach. Mario Biggeri et al, eds. (Basingstoke: Palgrave, 2011) 3-21, 6.
5) Basu, K., ‘Prologue’ in Children and the Capability Approach, ibid, x.
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justification for prioritising children’s welfare rights.6 Their paper will be 
discussed in detail later, but it is important to note at this stage that their argu-
ment does not address broader questions relating to children’s rights, including 
the child’s right to development.
It is beyond the scope of this article to exhaust all the questions that the rela-
tionship between the Capability Approach and children’s rights raises. Rather, 
the article will focus on two main questions: whether the Capability Approach’s 
conception of development should be used in analysing the child’s right to 
development, and if the answer is in the affirmative, how it should be done.
The article has four parts. The first introduces briefly the Convention’s con-
ception of ‘children’s development’ and right to development, as was inter-
preted by the UN Committee on the Rights of the Child. It claims that the 
Committee adopts a ‘human becomings’ conception of childhood, and there-
fore its interpretation focuses on the child’s life as an adult, thus failing to 
respect children’s agency and voice. Such an interpretation for a core right is 
somewhat problematic, since it neither provides coherent meaning, nor a con-
crete means of implementation. The second part introduces the Capability 
Approach’s conception of human development and suggests that it can, and 
should, be used in interpreting children’s development. The third part explores 
the possibilities of using the Capability Approach when interpreting human 
rights law, and discusses the potential limitations and advantages of this 
approach. The fourth and last part delineates three main contributions of the 
suggested approached: redefining the term ‘children’s development’; enhancing 
respect for children’s agency and voice; and developing concrete benchmarks to 
realise the right to development according to the UNCRC’s framework.
The current approach to the child’s right to development
As noted earlier, the UNCRC provides comprehensive protection for eight 
different segments of children’s development, which join the recognition of 
children’s rights to development in Article 6(2). The importance that the 
Convention sees in protecting children’s development was further empha-
sised by the UN Committee on the Rights of the Child in General Comment 
Number 5, which defines the rights to life, survival and development as one of 
the Convention’s four guiding principles, together with the child’s right to 
non-discrimination (Article 2), the child’s right to participation (Article 12) 
and the principle of the best interests of the child (Article 3).7 Furthermore, in 
6) Dixon, R. and M. Nussbaum, ‘Children’s Rights and a Capability Approach: The Question of 
Special Priority’ Cornell Law Review 97 (2011-2012): 549-593.
7) UNCRC, General Comment number 5, CRC/GC/2003/5.
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its guidelines for reporting, the Committee asks States Parties to report on 
measures taken to ensure children’s right to development.8 Nonetheless, the 
Committee’s jurisprudence demonstrates how difficult it is to interpret the 
right when your point of departure is the ‘human becomings’ conception of 
childhood.9
The ‘human becomings’ conception of childhood perceives children as 
passive actors, lacking agency, weak, vulnerable, and in need of protection.10 
Childhood and children are positioned against adulthood and adults, and 
childhood is described as ‘the absence of adult qualities’.11 Children are seen 
as ‘unfinished products’,12 and as human beings in the making. Childhood is 
therefore a ‘journey toward a destination’,13 or as James and Prout articulate it, 
childhood is ‘a highly complex and engineered trajectory towards adulthood’.14 
In a similar vein, children’s development has been cared for according to main-
stream developmental psychology theories. Using developmental psychology 
perpetuates the image of the child as a person that ought to ‘successfully’ or 
‘normally’ climb up the ladder of development, and eventually completes 
the transition and becomes a fully competent adult. However, developmental 
psychology, as Erica Burman notes, is neither a homogeneous body of knowl-
edge, nor a neutral one. It creates a specific image of childhood that ultimately 
enables adults to colonise children and control their lives.15
Therefore, when the ‘human becomings’ conception of childhood is used in 
conjunction with developmental psychology, it is almost impossible to inter-
pret the right to development in any way other than as a right of the child to 
become an adult. While circumventing from defining the right to develop-
ment itself, the Committee prioritises the protection of children’s develop-
ment in one of two ways: it either defines it as a violation of one right of the 
child, for example the right to education (Articles 28-29) as a violation of the 
right to development as well, or it determines that a protection of another and 
  8) UNCRC, Treaty-specific guidelines regarding the form and content of periodic reports to be 
submitted by States parties under article 44, paragraph 1 (b), of the Convention on the Rights of 
the Child, CRC/C/58/Rev.2.
  9) Peleg, supra n. 2. See also Martin Woodhead’s claim that only young children are entitled to 
this right. M. Woodhead, ‘Early Childhood Development: A Question of Rights’, International 
Journal of Early Childhood 37 (2005): 79-98.
10) For non-Western perspectives see, for example, Stafford, C., The Roads of Chinese Childhood 
(Cambridge: Cambridge University Press, 1995); Ito, T., ‘New Education For Underprivileged 
Children: The Condition of Children’s Rights in Japanese Law’, Paedagogica Historica 48 (2012): 
153-167. See also LeVine, R.A. and R. S. New, Anthropology and Child Development (Oxford: 
Blackwell Publishing, 2008).
11) Archard, D., Children: Rights and Childhood (London: Routledge, 1993) 36.
12) Smart, C. et al, The Changing Experience of Childhood (Cambridge: Polity, 2001) 1.
13) Lee, supra n. 1, 8.
14) James and Prout, supra n. 1, 226.
15) Burman, E., Deconstructing Development Psychology (2nd edition, Palgrave: London, 2008).
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different right, for example the right to non-discrimination (Article 2), is a pre-
condition for the realisation of the child’s development (and rarely also the 
right to development).16 This approach fails to respect children’s agency in the 
context of development, and thus perpetuates the image of the child as an 
adult in making. It also does not provide a distinct or a coherent meaning to 
the right to development, which makes it difficult to implement.
In contrast to the ‘human becomings’ conception, the ‘human beings’ con-
ception17 embraces diverse and more complex notions of childhood.18 Accord-
ing to this approach, children are perceived as active persons and not as 
‘projects’,19 and childhood is being studied independently, and not by compar-
ing children to adults.20 As human ‘beings’, children are considered as human 
rights holders,21 which means that they ‘can exercise agency… as agents, rights 
bearers can participate. They can make their own lives, rather than having 
their lives made for them.’22 As social agents,23 children can now be seen as 
part of the social structure and social fabric, and subsequently their active role 
in it is respected.24 This respect includes having their opinions heard and 
taken into consideration. Article 12 of the Convention reflects this perception 
in acknowledging the child’s right to participation.25
When one listens to children, one realises just how much children know 
about their lives and about their world. Children make sense of their own 
experience of poverty (and what qualifies as ‘well-being’),26 of living on the 
16) Peleg, supra n. 2.
17) Wells, K., Childhood in a Global Perspective (Cambridge: Polity Press, 2009) 1-24.
18) Prout, A., The Future Of Childhood (London: Routledge, 2005) 7-34; Prout and James, ‘A New 
Paradigm for the Sociology of Childhood? Provenance, Promise and Problems’ in James and 
Prout, supra n. 1, 7-33.
19) Smart et al, supra n. 12, 13.
20) James and Prout, supra n. 1, 8. See also Mayall, B., Towards a Sociology of Childhood: Thinking 
From Children’s Lives (Gosport: Open University Press, 2002) 33.
21) Freeman, M., The Moral Status of Children (The Hague: Martinus Nijhoff, 1997). But see 
Annette Ruth Appell’s claim that even so, children’s rights are still being measured against 
their dependency. Ruth Appell, A., ‘The Pre-Political Child of Child-Centered Jurisprudence’ 
Houston Law Review 46 (2009-2010): 703-757, 721.
22) Freeman, M., ‘Why It Remains Important to Take Children’s Rights Seriously’, International 
Journal of Children’s Rights 15 (2007): 5-23, 8.
23) James, Allison, ‘Agency’, in Palgrave Handbook of Childhood Studies. Qvortrup, J. et al, eds. 
(Basingstoke: Palgrave 2009, 2011) 45-54.
24) Ibid, 38-40.
25) For an analysis of Article 12, see L. Lundy, ‘“Voice” is Not Enough: Conceptualising Article 12 
of the UN Convention on the Rights of the Child’, British Educational Research Journal (2007) 
33: 927-942.
26) Camfield, L. et al, ‘What’s the Use of “Well-Being” in Contexts of Child Poverty? Approaches 
to Research, Monitoring and Children’s Participation’ International Journal of Children’s Rights 
(2009) 17: 65-109; Goswami, H., ‘Social Relationships and Children’s Subjective Well-Being’ 
Social Indicator Research, (2011) Online First 26.5.2011; Z. Pavlovic and T. R. Leban, ‘Children’s 
Rights International Study Project (CRISP) – A Shift from the Focus on Children’s Rights to a 
Quality of Life Assessment Instrument’ Child Indicators Research 2 (2009): 265.
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street,27 of their health or from the fact that there are dying.28 Children are also 
able to articulate what human rights means,29 and how the UNCRC can be 
interpreted.30 If listened to, children can express their own point of view about 
their own development. Research shows that children are able to distinguish 
between the progression of development and the aims it should achieve. They 
associate ‘development’ with having a sense of direction in life, and what they 
see as the natural process of maturation. When perceiving ‘development’ as a 
natural process, according to Helga Kelle, the notion of getting older ‘can 
hardly be seen as a personal achievement’.31 As Priscilla Alderson et al have 
shown,32 children’s ability to express their views and preferences is not neces-
sarily a matter of age, but of space and willingness of adults to listen to them as 
well. Needless to say, it is not always easy to facilitate children’s participation 
(and decision-making),33 but problems in implementation should not under-
mine the foundations of the principle and its pursuit. If we respect children’s 
agency and autonomy, we also need to respect their values and priorities.34
Such an approach towards childhood and children’s development is radi-
cally different from the one that is used today. The alleged paradigm shift in 
childhood studies has skipped the discussion concerning ‘children’s develop-
ment’ and right to development. The image of the developing child still domi-
nates and dictates the discussion about this right. For this reason, for example, 
the right to development is usually overlooked in the literature, even when 
27) Mandel Butler, U., ‘Freedom, Revolt and “Citizenship”’, Childhood 16 (2009): 11-29; See also 
Raffaelli, M., ‘How Do Brazilian Street Youth Experience “the Street”?’, Childhood 8 (2001) 
396-415.
28) Bluebond-Langner, M., The Private Worlds of Dying Children (Princeton: Princeton 
University Press, 1978) 5.
29) Ruck, M. D. et al, ‘Children’s and Adolescents’ Understanding of Rights: Balancing 
Nurturance and Self-Determination’, Child Development 64 (1988): 404; Ruck, M. D. et al, 
‘Adolescents’ and Children’s Knowledge About Their Rights: Some Evidence For How Young 
People View Rights In Their Own Lives’ Journal of Adolescence 21 (1998): 275-289.
30) Heesterman, W.,‘An Assessment of the Impact of Youth Submission on the United 
Nations Committee on the Rights of the Child’, International Journal of Children’s Rights 13 
(2005): 351-378.
31) Kelle, H., ‘The Discourse of “Development” – How 9 to 12-Year-Old Children Construct 
“Childish” and “Future Development” Identified Within Their Peer Culture’, Childhood 8 (2001): 
95-111, 109; In a different context see Maclure, R., ‘The Dynamics of Youth Participation: Insights 
from Research Fieldwork with Female Youth in Senegal’, in Children’s Rights and International 
Development. Denov, M. et al, eds. (New York, Palgrave, 2011) 155-174.
32) Alderson, P. et al, ‘The Participation Rights of Premature Babies’, International Journal of 
Children’s Rights 13 (2005): 31-50.
33) Holland, S. et al, ‘Power, Agency and Participatory Agenda: A Critical Exploration of Young’s 
People’s Engagement in Participative Qualitative Research’, Childhood 17 (2010): 360-375.
34) Ballet, J. et al, ‘Children Agency and the Capability Approach – A Conceptual Framework’ 
in Children and the Capability Approach. M. Biggeri et al, eds. (Basingstoke: Palgrave Macmillan 
2011) 22-46, 22.
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discussing the connection between law and child development,35 or interna-
tional development and children.36
In the next section I argue that using the Capability Approach as a theoreti-
cal framework can lead to a reconceptualisation of ‘children’s development’, 
and subsequently the child’s right to development, in a way that can offer a 
remedy to these shortcomings.
The capability approach’s concept of ‘human development’
The Capability Approach (or ‘approaches’)37 is a moral theory that focuses on 
human development, suggesting that ‘development’ should be conceptualised 
as ‘freedom’.38 The Capability Approach is a response to the traditional 
approach, which linked human development to economic growth as a means 
of eliminating poverty and satisfying people’s ‘basic needs’.39 Amartya Sen and 
Martha Nussbaum, who pioneered this theory, claimed that the traditional 
conception of human development reflects a narrow understanding of human 
life and poverty, and is blind to social exclusion. Ignoring those at the margins, 
Sen and Nussbaum argue, is being disrespectful of people’s human dignity. 
They therefore suggested conceptualising ‘development’ as a process that facil-
itates people’s ability to live lives worth living,40 by expanding their capability 
and increasing their real opportunities. Taking the view that people should not 
be bound by choices determined by others,41 they claim that people should 
have a stake in shaping their own lives in a way that respects their agency.42
Arguably, the best way to realise those personal preferences is by respecting 
people agency and participation in making choices. Participation should not 
35) See, for example, Buss, E. and M. Maclean, The Law and Child Development (Falmer: 
Ashgate, 2011), and Freeman, F., ‘Emily Buss and Mavis Maclean – The Law and Child 
Development’, International Journal of Children’s Rights 19 (2011): 705-707, 707.
36) Hanson, O. and O. Nieuwenhuys, Reconceptualizing Children’s Development in International 
Development (Cambridge: Cambridge University Press, 2013).
37) It has also been suggested that it should be called ‘the capability creation’. Gasper, D., ‘What 
Is the Capability Approach? Its Core, Rationale, Partners and Dangers’, Journal of Socio-
Economics 36 (2007): 335-359, 346.
38) Sen, supra n. 3.
39) Esteva, G., ‘Development’ in The Development Dictionary. W. Sachs, ed. (London: Zed Books, 
1992) 6-25; Streeten, P. and S. Javed Burki, ‘Basic Needs: Some Issues’ World Development  
6 (1978): 411-421; On women’s basic needs see I. Palmer, ‘Rural Women and the Basic Needs 
Approach to Development’, International Labour Review 115 (1977): 97-107.
40) Moore, A. and R. Crisp, ‘Welfarism in Moral Theory’, Australian Journal of Philosophy  
74 (1996): 598-613; L. Hamilton, ‘A Theory of True Interests in the Work of Amartya Sen’, 
Government and Opposition 34 (1999): 516.
41) Sen, A., Inequality Re-examined (Cambridge: Harvard University Press, 1992) 39.
42) Dixon and Nussbaum, supra n. 6, 557.
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be seen only as a methodological tool, but also as a substantial element of 
development. Participation guarantees people’s freedoms and ‘enhances 
the ability of people to help themselves and also to influence the world… the 
concern here relates to what we may call the “agency aspect” of the individ-
ual’.43 According to Nussbaum, denying people the ability to choose not only 
denies their agency but also ‘makes life not worthy of human dignity’.44 
According to Sen, freedom to choose is ‘both the primary end’ and ‘the princi-
pal means of development’.45 I therefore argue that utilising this approach 
to human development in the context of children’s rights in general, and of 
the right to development in particular, can radically change the way this right 
is addressed, and gives it a new necessary meaning.
If development is freedom, then ‘unfreedom’ is a deprivation of capabilities. 
For example, unfreedom can be a situation of famine or being under 
nourished, or having limited access to social services such as health care or 
functional education. In more abstract terms, Sen suggests that ‘unfreedom’ 
should be defined as an inequality ‘between women and men [and] denial of 
political liberty and basic civil rights’.46 Social, political, economic and cultural 
power structures constitute the core causes of unfreedoms, since they prevent 
the marginalised from benefiting from economic prosperity. Arguably, chil-
dren are structurally positioned in most societies in a chronic condition of 
‘unfreedon’ due to political, social and cultural structures and social attitudes 
towards children.
Another assertion is that people should not be seen as homogenous or as 
having equal opportunities. Gender, disability, age, ethnicity or illness have 
great influence on levels of income and accessibility to social services, which 
are necessary to maintain similar standards of living. For example, a person 
with a disability needs to spend a larger percentage of her income on buying 
medications and treatments (and also needs more access to health care ser-
vices) than what a person without a disability and a same level of income 
spends on her health. Therefore, in order to maintain a similar standard of 
living, these two peoples need different resources. I argue that this analogy 
applies to children as well. Children should not be seen as a homogenous 
group, and their unique requirements for living dignified lives ought to be 
met.47 A similar conclusion should be reached when taking the approach 
the agency of every child should be respected. In the context of their right to 
43) Ibid.
44) Nussbaum, M. C., Creating Capabilities – The Human Development Approach (Cambridge: 
Harvard University Press, 2011) 31.
45) Ibid, 16.
46) Ibid, 15.
47) Cf to Dixon and Nussbaum, supra n. 6, 556-563.
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development, contextualising children’s lives based on social attitudes toward 
their individual characteristics (gender, disability etc.) or their group affilia-
tion (social class, religious etc.) will enable to diversify the meaning of chil-
dren’s development accordingly.
Another significant dimension of the Capability Approach is the idea of 
‘functions’. According to Sen, functions are ‘the various things a person may 
value being and doing’.48 This includes, for example, having a job or being 
healthy, as well as more abstract concepts such as happiness. Sen argues that 
every person should define his or her own functions, and therefore he does not 
suggest one definitive set of functions.49 Nonetheless, a precondition to be 
able to define a set of personal functions and being able to live accordingly, is 
having necessary capabilities. Sen uses the availability of food as an example to 
illustrate his point about the connection between functions and capabilities. 
According to this example, a person might not eat for one of two reasons: 
either he does not have food, or he has decided to fast or go on a diet.50 While 
the latter is a matter of choice (function), the former is a matter of lack of 
capabilities. Capabilities can therefore be understood as ‘the range of options 
a person has in deciding what kind of life to lead’,51 which ‘represent the 
various combinations of functioning (being and doing) that the person can 
achieve’,52 and as such constitutes one’s freedom. Nussbaum defines capabili-
ties in slightly different terms, claiming that capabilities are those entities 
that enable people to execute their human functions.53 Capabilities should 
therefore be understood as ‘what people are actually able to do and to be’.54 
According to Nussbaum, all human beings ought to have the freedom to choose 
whether they exercise these capabilities and in which ways they do so.55 
Despite the tendency to overlook children in that regard, children too 
should be seen as entitled to exercise their agency and capabilities. While 
doing so, it is up to the duty bearers – in the context of the UNCRC they are 
the child’s parents (or other legal guardians), the state and the international 
community56 – to enable them to do so. This position is similar, but not 
48) Sen, Development as Freedom, supra n. 3, 75.
49) Sen, A., ‘Human Rights and Capabilities’ Journal of Human Development 6 (2005): 151, 
157-160.
50) Sen, Inequality Re-examined, supra n. 41.
51) Drèze, J. and A. Sen, India: Economic Development and Social Opportunity (Oxford: Oxford 
University Press, 1995) 10.
52) Sen, Inequality Re-examined, supra n. 41, 4.
53) M. Nussbaum, M., ‘Women’s Capabilities and Social Justice’, Journal of Human Development 
1 (2000): 219-247, 242.
54) Ibid, 222-223.
55) Ibid, 235.
56) Article 4 of the UNCRC.
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identical, to the positions of John Holt and Richard Farson,57 not least because 
it is not a call for neglecting children to their rights.58 Instead it argues for change 
in the theoretical approach towards children’s development and their a 
bility – and rights – to exercise agency and participate in shaping their own lives.
Distinguishing between internal capabilities and substantial freedoms 
helps to realise the differences between ‘freedom’ and ‘capabilities’. Internal 
capabilities are a person’s intellectual and emotional capacities, fitness and 
health, level of learning skills etc. Substantial freedom is the ability to make a 
choice. This ability depends on personal capacities as well as the political, 
social and economic environments as combined capabilities. Based on this 
distinction, Nussbaum argues that if a given society seeks to promote human 
capabilities, it ought to support the development of internal capabilities 
‘through education resources to enhance physical and emotional health, sup-
port for family care and love, a system of education and much more’.59 This 
distinction clarifies how society can enable the production of internal capa-
bilities, while reducing or eliminating the options of people to function in 
accordance with those capabilities. For example, people can be given access 
to education in order to develop their capability to express themselves. But 
if soon after they are denied the right to freedom of expression, for example, 
their combined capability is denied as well.60 Society, therefore, cannot 
provide and produce combined capabilities ‘without producing internal capa-
bilities’.61 This distinction, and call for holistic and continuing securing capa-
bilities,62 is vital for children and important for the reconceptualisation of the 
child’s right to development, as the next section elaborates.
The capability approach and the child’s right to development
This section develops the argument that children should be seen as entitled to 
develop, according to the Capability Approach’s conception of human devel-
opment. I suggest that to reconceptualise the meaning of ‘children’s develop-
ment’ according to the Capability Approach can change the interpretation of 
the child’s right to development. More specifically, it can enhance further 
57) Holt, J., Escape From Childhood (Middlesex: Penguin Books, 1974); Farson, R. E., Birthrights 
(Michigan: University of Michigan Press, 1974).
58) Cf to Hafen, B. C. and J. O. Hafen, ‘Abandoning Children to Their Autonomy: The United 
Nations Convention on the Rights of the Child’, Harvard International Law Journal (1996) 37: 
449-492.
59) Nussbaum, Creating Capabilities – The Human Development Approach, supra n. 44, 21.
60) Ibid, 23.
61) Ibid.
62) Wollf, J. and A. De-Shalit, Disadvantage (Oxford: Oxford University Press, 2007).
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respect for children’s agency and voice, and it will make it possible to concre-
tise the meaning of the child’s right to development. But first, there is a need 
to address the preliminary questions concerning the ability to adapt the 
Capability Approach to interpret children’s human rights. After answering this 
question in the affirmative, I will discuss the nexus between the Capability 
Approach and children.
As has been mentioned earlier, until recently the applicability of the 
Capability Approach to children has rarely been addressed, and only recently 
have these questions begun to attract some attention.63 One of the main 
reasons for this lack of discussion is rooted, I believe, in Sen upholding the 
‘human becomings’ model of childhood, suggesting that children will enjoy 
their freedoms when they become competent adults.64 Competency is there-
fore a key difficulty that Sen sees in linking children and the Capability 
Approach. Madoka Saito expresses a similar concern, when he asks, ‘how can 
we apply the Capability Approach to children, since children are not mature 
enough to make decision by themselves?’65 Likewise, Biggeri et al assert that 
the ‘Capability Approach obviously implies the individual’s capacity for 
self-determination, which may not apply to children’.66
The question of children’s competence and capacity to choose is not unique 
to this context. The question, or the tension, about the relationship between 
capability and capacities is being asked about almost every aspect of the child’s 
life and rights, including, for example, consent to medical treatment,67 the age 
of criminal responsibility68 and the right of children to vote in a country’s gen-
eral election.69 These debates are relevant in our context as they demonstrate 
the dominance of conceptions about children’s capacities, thus demonstrating 
that this is a normative debate rather than a question of having ‘empirical’ 
capacities to choose. In other words, it is not children’s ability to choose that 
is debated, but rather the space that society, adults and the law gives children 
63) See, for example, the collection of articles by Biggeri et al, supra n. 4. See also Hanson and 
Nieuwenhuys, supra n. 36.
64) Saito, M., ‘Amartya Sen’s Capability Approach to Education: A Critical Exploration’, Journal 
of Philosophy of Education 37 (2003): 17, 25.
65) Saito, Supra n. 64.
66) Biggeri, M. et al, ‘Children’s Agency and the Capability Approach: A Conceptual Framework’, 
supra n. 4, 22-45, 24.
67) A leading case is Gillick v. West Norfolk and Wisbech Area Health Authority [1986] AC 112. See 
Freeman, M., ‘Rethinking Gillick’, International Journal of Children’s Rights 13 (2005): 201-217.
68) Different countries subscribe to different age of criminal responsibility, ranging from the 
age of 7 to the age of 18. See Melchiorre, A. and E. Atkins, At What Age Are School-Children 
Employed, Married and Taken to Court? (Right to Education Project, London 2011) 30-32.
69) Jans, M., ‘Children as Citizens’, Childhood 11 (2004): 27-44; Wall, J., ‘Can Democracy 
Represent Children? Towards a Politics of Difference’, Childhood 19 (2012): 86-100; Roche, J., 
‘Children: Rights, Participation and Citizenship’, Childhood 6 (1999): 475-493; Nolan, A., 
Children’s Socio-Economic Rights, Democracy and the Courts (Oxford: Hart, 2011) 43-92.
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in order to make a choice, and the tolerance for what adults consider to be a 
mistake.
The issue here is not empirical but normative: whether society and adults, 
who dominate children’s lives, respect children’s right to choose and to 
develop, and if so – to what extent. I therefore suggest that the Capability 
Approach should be acknowledged as relevant to children for all the reasons 
that it is considered to be relevant to all human beings, including the elderly 
and those with disabilities (while acknowledging the fundamental differences 
between children and these two groups).70 Claiming that the Capability 
Approach is not relevant to children because children lack the capacity to 
choose undermines the core principle of the Capability Approach itself. 
One cannot advocate in favour of respecting the human dignity and agency of 
all people, especially those who formerly were at the margins of their societies 
(and were perceived to lack certain capacities), while denying the same 
universal principles from children, by arguing that they lack capacities. 
Furthermore, the proposition that children lack required capacity is a self- 
fulfilling prophecy, leading to a situation where children are being denied the 
opportunity to challenge this presumption, thus perpetuating the denial of 
their agency.71 This approach creates a vicious circle that excludes children 
from the ability to develop, according to the Capability Approach’s conception 
of development as freedom.
Following Nussbaum’s discussion about internal and combined capabilities, 
it can be further argued that once children are given the opportunity to develop 
their internal capabilities, primarily through education, they will no longer 
be denied the opportunity or entitlement to develop. This statement can be 
formulated in human rights terms, thus suggesting that children can develop 
their internal capabilities when their human right to education is being real-
ised, and their agency is respected. At this point it becomes evident that 
respecting children’s agency and rights is an issue that keeps reappearing in 
considering any aspect of the child’s right to development. Therefore, I will 
now discuss the applicability of utilising the Capability Approach to analyse 
human rights law.
Human rights law and the capability approach
Sen distinguished between the ethics of human rights and human rights law, 
claiming that the moral strength of the former does not require the existence 
70) Cf to Dixon and Nussbaum, supra n. 6.
71) On this see Federle, K. H.,’Rights Flow Downhill’, International Journal of Children’s Rights  
2 (1994): 343-368.
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of the latter. At a practical level, Sen claims that human rights law is a good 
rhetorical tool for creating and imposing obligations on states to provide the 
capabilities necessary for human development.72 Referring to the structure of 
international human rights law, Séverine Deneulim asserts that the Capability 
Approach enables us to ‘look at the institutional framework that allows that 
right to be fulfilled’.73 In other words, the Capability Approach can be seen as 
‘an evaluative framework for assessing states of affairs’.74 According to this 
approach, human rights analysis defines social structures according to the 
Capability Approach, but should not follow it in interpreting specific rights. 
Unlike Sen, Nussbaum is much more in favour of connecting the Capability 
Approach and human rights, including children’s rights.75
A different question is concerned with equality and discrimination. While 
the recognition of diversity among people and the impacts that disadvantages 
have on people’s development is central to the Capability Approach, Deneulim 
claims that ‘the human rights approach does not necessarily take such differ-
ences into account’,76 and therefore will not fulfil the Capability Approach’s 
goals. The problem with this liberal argument is that it ignores substantial 
equality and affirmative action policies. It is against this approach that Dixon 
and Nussbaum claim that the Capability Approach can be used in order to 
justify prioritising children’s welfare rights,77 especially those rights that are 
sensitive ‘both to children’s welfare needs and to children’s agency’.78 However, 
in their discussions, Dixon and Nussbaum compare children’s competence, 
agency and rights to the rights of people with intellectual disabilities, claiming 
that recognition of children’s rights is based on a similar ‘moral claim of all 
human beings to be afforded full human dignity, regardless of their capacity 
for rational or reasoned participation in public or civil life’.79 Therefore, 
children’s ‘vulnerability’80 justifies affirmative action policies, which aim to 
provide children with the necessary capabilities to be free.
72) Sen, A.,’Capabilities and Well-Being’ in Quality of Life. Nussbaum, M. and A. Sen, eds. 
(Oxford: Oxford University Press, 1993) 30-53.
73) Deneulim, S., ‘Ideas Related to Human Development’ in An Introduction to the Human 
Development and Capabilities Approach. Deneulim, S. and L. Shahani, eds. (London: Earthscan, 
2009) 49-70, 60.
74) Ibid.
75) Nussbaum, M., ‘Human Capabilities, Female Human Beings’ in Women, Culture and 
Development: A Study on Human Capabilities. M. Nussbaum and J. Glover, eds. (Oxford: Oxford 
University Press, 1995) 61-104; Nussbaum, M., ‘Capabilities as Fundamental Entitlements: Sen 
and Global Justice’, Feminist Economics 9 (2003): 33-59.
76) Ibid, 61.
77) Dixon and Nussbaum, supra n. 6.
78) Ibid, 553.
79) Ibid.
80) Ibid, 573-578. The second justification is ‘cost effective analysis’; see pp. 578-584.
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Such a comparison is highly problematic for a number of reasons. First, it 
measures children against adult-tailored standards of competency, perpetuat-
ing the notion that a competent adult is the standard that children must meet 
in order to be entitled to develop. Second, it refutes the respect we have for 
children for what they will become (‘human becomings’) or for who they are 
now (‘human beings’). Third, it contradicts the perceptions of children as 
‘human becomings’ and as persons in a mode of change and developing their 
capacities. While children are ‘developing’ and are capable of change, adults 
with intellectual disabilities are in a static mode. They do not develop and 
their capacities, by and large, do not evolve. Fourth, this comparison implies 
that childhood is some sort of disability. While there may be some similarities 
between the current cognitive functions of children and adults with mental 
capabilities, placing them in the same category not only undermines respect 
for children’s human dignity in general, but also raises the question of how 
children with mental capabilities should be conceptualised, and how they 
should be treated in light of this view.
I see less significance in using the Capability Approach in order to validate 
the respect to children’s rights, and rather suggest utilising it in a more narrow 
way, focusing on the implications of using the Capability Approach in the 
context of the child’s right to development. Biggeri et al take a similar, more 
practical, approach, suggesting that ‘human rights can be used as the main 
argument for defending a list of relevant capabilities for children’,81 and that 
the Capability Approach ‘can become a framework for normative evaluation 
and policy implementation. Therefore, it seems that the libertarian-inspired 
human rights approach and the Capability Approach can dialogue and com-
plement each other quite well.’82 Taking this idea forward, they suggest a con-
crete mode of operation:
in the case of children, on the one hand human rights can be used as the main argu-
ment for defending a list of relevant capabilities for children, and on the other the 
Capability Approach can become a framework for normative evaluation and policy 
implementation.83
I will return to this point in detail in the next section. First, I will discuss how 
the Capability Approach can reconceptualise children’s development, in the 
context of the child’s right to development.
81) Biggeri, M. et al, ‘Children’s Agency and the Capability Approach: A Conceptual Framework’, 
in Biggeri, M. et al (eds) Children and the Capability Approach, supra n. 4, 22-45, 39-40.
82) Ibid.
83) Ibid.
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Reconceptualising ‘Children’s Development’
Applying the Capability Approach’s conception of human development when 
interpreting the child’s legal right to development can lead to three necessary 
changes: expanding the meaning of children’s development beyond its current 
psycho-social meaning; enabling the development of a practical and concrete 
means of implementation; enhance the respect for children’s agency and their 
right to participation.
The first contribution of the Capability Approach to the analysis of chil-
dren’s development and the child’s right to development is to expand the 
meaning of the term ‘children’s development’ beyond its current interpreta-
tion. It enables to diversify the meaning of this term and to stop seeing devel-
opmental psychology, which is the current dominant framework, as the only 
conceptual framework that should inform the interpretation of this term. 
Diversifying the meaning of children’s development will inevitably lead to the 
rethinking of the concept of childhood. The reason is that the theoretical 
coherence of the current ‘human becomings’ will be undermined if ‘children’s 
development’ does not only mean growing up.
The second contribution derives from the above-suggested change. I sug-
gest using the terminology of capabilities to concretise ‘children’s develop-
ment’. While Sen does not define the types of capabilities a person needs in 
order to be free, Polly Vizard claims that despite this reservation, international 
human rights law can help to generate ‘a minimal list of central and basic 
capabilities with universal coverage’.84 According to Biggeri and Mehrotra, the 
Capability Approach is a ‘framework for normative evaluation and policy 
implementation’,85 and it provides normative and positive grounds for pro-
moting these capabilities in children. Similarly, Nussbaum suggests a list of ten 
capabilities that she qualifies as concrete, universal, inseparable and essential 
to the realisation of human development. The ten capabilities are: life, bodily 
health, bodily integrity, sense, imagination and thought, emotions, practical 
reason, affiliation, other species and play and control over one’s environ-
ment.86 Although Nussbaum considers these as the minimum universal capa-
bilities that are necessary for us to be free, she admits that this list is slightly 
ambiguous, so individual societies can elaborate and interpret it differently, 
84) Vizard, P., ‘Specifying and Justifying a Basic Capability Set: Should the International Human 
Rights Framework be Given a More Direct Role?’, Oxford Development Studies 35 (2007): 
225-250, 235.
85) Biggeri, B., et al, ‘Children’s Agency and the Capability Approach: A Conceptual Framework’, 
in Children and the Capability Approach, supra n. 4, 39-40.
86) Nussbaum, Creating Capabilities – The Human Development Approach, supra n. 44, 33-34.
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according to their own traditions and histories.87 According to Vizard, these 
ten capabilities can be seen as grounds for a ‘human rights based capability 
framework’,88 mainly because they resemble the basic universal rights that 
are protected by the Universal Declaration of Human Rights and the 1966 
Covenants as universal human rights.89
This list of capabilities can be seen as relevant for children for two reasons. 
First, it meets children’s needs and arguably cannot be challenged on the basis 
of a pre-requirement for capacities. Second, following Vizard’s observation, 
many of these capabilities are defined as children’s rights by the Convention 
(which protects the child’s right to life, health, bodily integrity, affiliations 
and play in Articles 6, 24, 19, 7, 8, 9, 11 and 31, respectively), so these rights, or 
children’s entitlement to these capabilities, have universal acceptance (if only 
due to the near-universal ratification of the Convention). Therefore, taking the 
Capability Approach’s perspective, these rights can be understood as neces-
sary to the realisation of the child’s right to development. Moreover, this list of 
capabilities also resembles the UNCRC’s approach to the support of children’s 
development.90 However, in the context of the Capability Approach, these 
capabilities – and the rights they resemble – serve a different purpose. These 
capabilities and corresponding rights support the child’s freedom, whilst the 
Committee takes these rights as means to enable the child to become an adult.
A key problem with this list is that, like the Capability Approach in general, 
it was not created with children in mind. Biggeri and Mehrotra therefore 
suggest a different list, which they claim has more relevance to children. Their 
list includes 14 capabilities: life and physical health; love and care; mental well-
being; bodily integrity and safety; social relations; participation; education; 
freedom from economic and non-economic exploitation; shelter and environ-
ment; leisure activities; respect; religion and identity; time autonomy; and 
mobility.91 Similar to Nussbaum’s list, nine of the capabilities in this list can be 
named as children’s rights under the Convention (Articles 6, 24, 12, 28, 29, 32, 
27, 31, 14, 30, 7 and 8, respectively). The remaining capabilities, such as love and 
care, social relations and respect, are not considered human rights.92
87) Nussbaum, Ibid, 40. See Robeyns’ claim that such a list should be rejected since it narrows 
down Sen’s approach: I. Robeyns, ‘An Unworkable Idea or a Promising Alternative? Sen’s 
Capability Approach Re-examined’ (1993) Center of Economic Discussion on Paper 00.30. 
University of Leuven, Mimeo.
88) Vizard, supra n. 84, 234-235.
89) Ibid.
90) Peleg, supra n. 2.
91) Biggeri, M. and S. Mehrotra, ‘Child Poverty as Capability Deprivation: How to Choose 
Domains of Child Well-being and Poverty’, in Children and the Capability Approach, supra n. 4, 51.
92) Though it was suggested that children do have the right to be loved, and the right to ‘time 
autonomy’. See Korczak, J., ‘How to Love a Child’ in Selected works of Janusz Korczak. Wolins, 
M., ed. (Washington D.C: National Science Foundation, 1967) 355-356.
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By employing the Capability Approach’s terminology, it can be argued that 
realising these rights provides the necessary capabilities for the child to be 
free. In practice, protecting these rights of children will serve dual purposes: 
protecting these rights themselves, and protecting all these rights simultane-
ously and constantly so every child has an equal opportunity to be free. For the 
children who live in any of the 193 states that signed and ratified the Conven-
tion, there is a source of obligation in international human rights law that 
obliges the different duty bearers to promote their capabilities and thus pro-
mote their human development. More specifically, the commitment of states 
parties is to promote these capabilities to ‘the maximum extent possible’.93
The third contribution of the Capability Approach is enhanced respect for 
the agency of individual children and children as a collective, and for chil-
dren’s right to participation. The Capability Approach’s framework enables to 
emphasise the particular attention that should be given to the child’s right 
to participate in shaping her own future. If children articulate their views 
concerning their own freedom, it will ease the tension between the two dis-
tinct conceptions of childhood – ‘human becomings’ and ‘human beings’. 
Children should participate in the creation of a new interpretation of the right 
to development, and contribute their own opinions on the subject. They 
should also be part of the process of realising the right to development in 
practice, including in the process of developing implementation tools and 
practices (for example, development policies and programmes, and drafting 
new legislation on the subject). Flavio Comim claims that in the context of the 
Capability Approach, children usually ‘are not consulted in the meaning of 
an active actor in society’,94 though this sort of treatment ignores the fact 
that ‘children would probably define the meaning of being an active actor or 
citizen differently’.95 While Comim flags up this latter point as a potential 
argument against realising children’s participation, this argument is in fact an 
excellent reason why children should participate. Their unique point of view 
about their own development is the reason for giving them a voice, rather than 
a reason to continue silencing them. Adopting the view that children, even 
toddlers,96 can and should express their preferences enables us to overcome 
one of the main barriers for implementing the Capability Approach in analys-
ing the child’s right to development. Children should play an active role in 
realising their self-determination, and express their preference about their 
own future. It seems that Saito is alarmed by this sort of suggestion, and there-
fore warns us that,
93) Article 6(2) of the UNCRC.
94) Comim et al, supra n. 4, 7.
95) Ibid.
96) See Alderson, supra n. 32.
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giving temporary freedom to a child does not always mean that the child will have free-
dom in future, and similarly, restricting the temporary freedom of a child may well expend 
the freedom that the child will have in the future. We, therefore, have to consider the 
freedom for a child in a lifelong perspective.97
This concern for the child’s future is well placed. However, one should not 
easily dismiss or undermine the value of the child’s life in the present, and its 
manifestation in the right to participation. This strong preference for safe-
guarding the child’s future undermines the recognition of children as rights 
holders, depriving them of agency and voice. This preference is based on an 
assumption that sacrificing children’s freedom now will lead to a greater free-
dom in the future, once the child becomes an adult. Dixon and Nussbaum 
make a similar claim as they argue that ‘we ought to support capabilities that 
will best promote a long-term future of full capabilities’.98 But ensuring free-
doms in the future should not justify denying all freedoms in the present; 
rather, the contrary is true. Arguably, ensuring freedoms in the present will 
enable children to fulfil their potential and pursue lives worth living in the 
future. For this reason, children’s voices and opinions should not be silenced 
or dismissed, but rather amplified.
I do not argue that care for the child’s future should be overlooked when 
caring for children’s development or for children’s right to development. 
However, ensuring that the child will become an adult should also not be the 
only prism through which children’s lives and development are perceived. We 
should care for children’s life at the present time, and realise that children’s 
futures include not only their adulthood, but also their childhood and their 
future while still being children. The ‘future’ of a one-month-old baby includes 
more than 17 years of life before she becomes an adult.99 Maybe even more 
importantly, in the 17 years during which this one-month-old child is living, 
she is experiencing the world and exercising agency, and should have all of her 
human rights protected, including her right to development.
Conclusion
The article suggests using the Capability Approach as a normative framework 
to analyse the child’s right to development. Children, like adults, should be 
able to live lives worth living during their entire life span, including their time 
as children. The point of departure when interpreting the right to development 
97) Saito, Supra n. 64, 26.
98) Dixon and Nussbaum, supra n. 6, 555.
99) According to Article 1 of the Convention, unless an earlier age of majority applies.
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of children should be conceptualising children as active agents in shaping 
their own life, and respecting that they value different functions and have 
different capabilities from adults. Incorporating the Capability Approach’s 
understanding of development in the context of the child’s right to develop-
ment can help expand the meanings of ‘development’ beyond its current 
psycho-social conception, and the child’s right to development beyond its cur-
rent understanding as the child’s right to become an adult. The Capability 
Approach also suggests how the idea of ‘human development’ could be real-
ised in practice, delineating what the necessary capabilities are. Children’s 
agency deserves more respect than it currently gets, and such a change will 
shift the attention from questions of competence and welfare to those of 
human rights. It will enable to articulate the child’s right to development as a 
distinct and concrete human right – the child will be seen to be entitled to 
grow, not only as in need of growing.
Another implication of respecting children’s agency will be to respect 
children’s right to participation, which symbolises children’s ability – and 
right – to make sense of the world around them.100 Such a connection between 
children’s development and their right to participation has yet to be made. 
Ignoring children’s views in the context of their development perpetuates the 
image of children as passive subjects, whose sole purpose in life is to sit still 
and grow up. Children’s participation also reflects, and promotes, the under-
standing of ‘development’ as an emancipatory process, which is the contribu-
tion of the Capability Approach to our analysis. The manifestation of the right 
to development as an emancipatory right and giving children a voice in this 
process requires a social and cultural transformation.101 Such a change includes 
the creation of a ‘political space in which children are empowered to express 
their own distinctive and submerged point of view’.102 It will enable children, 
as a marginalised group, to express their own perspectives103 about their own 
development. Nonetheless, respecting children’s right to participation does 
not mean that children will dictate the course of their childhood and future 
adulthood, not least because no one, child and adult alike, has a free standing 
in society. Children’s participation does not mandate that children should be 
the only decision makers.
100) Lansdown, G., ‘International Developments in Children’s Participation: Lessons and 
Challenges’ in Children, Young People and Social Inclusion. Tisdall, K. et al, eds. (Bristol: The 
Policy Press, 2006) 139-155.
101) Lund, R.,‘At the Interface of Development Studies and Child Research: Rethinking 
Participating Child’, Children’s Geographies 5 (2007): 131-148.
102) Wall, supra n. 69, 92.
103) Thomas, N., ‘Towards a Theory of Children’s Participation’, International Journal of 
Children’s Rights 15 (2007): 199-218, 210.
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The article examined two lists of capabilities, with only one of them formu-
lated explicitly with the intention to meet children’s needs. These lists show 
that ‘children’s development’ can be translated into human rights terms. 
However, a more contextualised list should be further developed in order to 
meet the needs and rights of different children in different circumstances. The 
suggested capabilities can later be articulated in human rights terms, using the 
universal acceptance of the Convention as a positive source.
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